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1 INTRODUCTION
In many online systems that support Collective Intelligence (e.g. Wikipedia, question answering systems, and discussion
forums) dierent conicting points of view arise, even based on the same information (Apic et al. 2011; Introne et al. 2011;
Marvel et al. 2011). is raises the challenge of supporting consensus-making among community members. However,
many systems on the Web employ arbitrary aggregation rules to handle such tasks, due to the lack of clear appropriate
rule given the seings at hand, and the diculty of evaluating the potential alternatives. Further, the scalability, and
the complexity of consensus-making in online systems makes the use of traditional voting rules inadequate.
A crucial step towards applying online concensus-making is the representation of information. Argumentation has
been shown to provide a realistic environment to represent the conict on the Web (Buckingham Shum 2008; Klein
and Iandoli 2008; Rahwan et al. 2007). One of the most inuential frameworks is probably the abstract argumentation
framework, which was proposed by Dung (Dung 1995). In this framework, arguments are repesented by nodes, and
the defeat relations between these arguments are represented by arcs, which form an argumentation graph. is
argumentation graph can be evaluated (that is, some arguments are accepted, and others are rejected) in multiple
consistent ways. In multi-agent seings, where dierent agents can subscribe to dierent evaluations, an aggregation
rule is needed to produce a collective consistent evaluation. Unlike the case with simple aggregation of opinions for
isolated propositions, aggregation in the context of argumentation can pose further restrictions to ensure consistency.
Consider the following example, which considers making judgments when conicting information is provided.
Example 1.1 (Suspect Stephen). A commiee of 10 jury members was formed to make a collective decision about
whether there is evidence against Stephen, a potential suspect. e commiee is provided with the arguments that
were laid down by the opposing sides, to help them make an informed decision. Understandably, arguments of one side
are in conict with the other side’s arguments (refer to Figure 1 (a)). e relations among arguments, are represented
by an argumentation graph, in which nodes are arguments, and arcs are the defeat relations between arguments (as in
Figure 1 (a))).
Each of the ten members is expected to have a reasonable judgement about which arguments should be accepted.
Suppose that six out of the ten members believe that argument B should be accepted, and argumentC should be rejected
(thumbs-up/down above graph in Figure 1 (b)), while the other four think that argument C should be accepted and
argument B should be rejected (thumbs-up/down below graph). e question is the following: should the commiee
collectively accept argument A, thus accepting there is an evidence against Stephen, or not?
e problem highlighted in the previous example encompasses two issues: First, the provided information is
inconsistent. For example, one can see that arguments B and C cannot be accepted together. Likewise, the evaluation
of argument B inuences that of argument A i.e. if B is accepted, then A should be rejected, and vice versa. As such,
the evaluation of argument A is inuenced by the evaluation of B and C . Aggregating judgments over such a set of
inconsistent information is not as simple as it seems. Since in this example argument A contains the conclusion of
interest, one can suggest two possible methods as to how collectively evaluate A given indvidiuals’ evaluation: 1) ignore
the individuals’ evaluation of arguments B and C and only aggregate evaluations of argument A, and 2) ignore the
individuals’ evaluation of argument A, and aggregate evaluation of arguments B and C , and then use the outcome to
determine the collective evaluation of argument A. Applying these two methods on this example provides a similar
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1. An example of aggregation in contested domains.
outcome. Unfortunately, these two methods do not always yield the same outcome, as was shown in (Awad et al. 2015).1
Further, choosing between these two methods is not a simple task. ere have been many studies discussing the choice
1In fact, this problem mirrors the discursive dilemma (Peit 2001) in judgement aggregation (JA). e discursive dilemma refers to the paradox that the use
of the “simple” majority rule to aggregate “consistent” individuals’ judgments of logically related issues can result into “inconsistent” collective judgment
of these issues.
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between conclusion-based and premise-based methods, the counterparts of the above suggested methods (1 and 2,
respectively) in other elds of aggregation like judgement aggregation (JA) (Bonnefon 2010; Bovens and Rabinowicz
2006; Peit 2001; Pigozzi 2006). is suggests the inadequacy of classical voting in handling such problems.
e second issue is concerned with the amount of support needed to collectively make a judgment, and it mirrors
the issue of choosing among the supermajority rules with the majority and the unanimity rules being the two extremes.
A supermajority rule requires that for an alternative to be chosen collectively it has to receive at least k votes, where
k > 0.5 × N and N is the number of voters (k = N for unanimity and k = b1 + 0.5 × N c for majority). In the above
example, using the majority rule would result in the group concluding that there is no evidence against Stephen, while
using unanimity would result in the group being undecided about whether there is evidence against Stephen or not.
Although the comparison between these two methods has been studied extensively, both formally and experimentally
(Guman 1998; Miller and Vanberg 2015; esada 2011), it has never been studied experimentally in contested domains
where conicting information are considered in making a collective decision.
Recently, various rules were proposed to appropriately aggregate evaluations of argumentation graphs. e argument-
wise plurality rule (AWPR), which chooses the collective evaluation of each argument by plurality was dened and
analyzed in (Awad et al. 2015; Rahwan and Tohme´ 2010). On the other hand, Caminada and Pigozzi (Caminada and
Pigozzi 2011) showed how judgment aggregation concepts can be applied to formal argumentation in a dierent
way. ey proposed three possible operators for aggregating labellings, namely the sceptical operator, the credulous
operator, and the super credulous operator (collectively shortened here as SSCOs). ese operators guarantee not only
a well-formed outcome but also a compatible one, that is, it does not go against the judgment of any individual. e
analysis of the above methods so far has been restricted to a principle-based approach such as the one devised by Arrow
(Arrow 1951; Arrow et al. 2002), by evaluating aggregation rules on the base of satisfying seemingly plausible, “fairness”
postulates.
In this study, we oer the rst experimental-based study of aggregation rules in contested domains. We experimentally
compare the desirability of the principles employed by AWPR and SSCOs. We nd that principles employed by AWPR
are more favorable. However, there can be some conditions in which this is not the case. Our results provide clear
suggestions in regard of what aggregation rules to use given some assumed contexts, and oer a rst step towards the
evaluation of aggregation rules in contested domains.
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: ABSTRACT ARGUMENTATION AND LABELING AGGREGATION
RULES
In order to form reasonable judgments on arguments, a formal representation of the relations is needed. Arguments
and the relationship between them can be represented as a directed graph in which nodes represent arguments, and
arcs between nodes represent binary defeat relations over them. is framework is known as abstract argumentation
framework, proposed by Dung (Dung 1995). In the previous example, one can see that arguments B and C defeat each
other, and argument B defeats argument A.
Denition 2.1 (Argumentation framework). An argumentation framework is a pair AF = 〈A,⇀〉 where A is a nite
set of arguments and ⇀⊆ A × A is a defeat relation. An argument a defeats an argument b if (a,b) ∈⇀ (sometimes
wrien a ⇀ b).
For example, in Figure 2, argument a1 is defeated by arguments a2 and a4 which are, in turn, defeated by arguments
a3 and a5.
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a3 a2
a4
a1
a5
Fig. 2. A simple argument graph
One then can evaluate each argument (i.e. label (Caminada 2006; Caminada and Gabbay 2009) each argument) by
accepting it (i.e. labeling it as in), rejecting it (i.e. labeling it as out), or being undecided about it (i.e. labeling it as
undec). Formally, a labeling is a total function:
Denition 2.2 (Argument labeling). Let AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. An argument labeling is a
total function L : A→ {in, out, undec}.
is evaluation (or labeling), however, should follow some rules. One of the essential properties, that is common, is
the condition of completeness, and is captured, in terms of labelings, in the following two conditions:
(1) An argument is labeled accepted (or in) if and only if all its defeaters are rejected (or out).
(2) An argument is labeled rejected (or out) if and only if at least one of its defeaters is accepted (or in).
In all other cases, an argument should be labeled undecided (or undec). us, evaluating a set of arguments amounts to
labeling each argument using a labeling function L : A→ {in, out, undec} to capture these three possible labels. Any
labeling that satises the above conditions is a legal labeling, or a complete labeling. ese conditions can equivalently
be formulated as follows.
Denition 2.3 (Complete labeling). Let AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. A complete labeling is a total
function L : A→ {in, out, undec} such that:
• ∀a ∈ A : if L(a) = in then ∀b ∈ A : (b ⇀ a ⇒ L(b) = out);
• ∀a ∈ A : if L(a) = out then ∃b ∈ A s.t. (b ⇀ a ∧ L(b) = in); and
• ∀a ∈ A : if L(a) = undec then
– ∃b ∈ A : (b ⇀ a ∧ L(b) = undec); and
– @b ∈ A : (b ⇀ a ∧ L(b) = in)
From Example 1.1, one can see that there can be dierent reasonable positions regarding the evaluation of an
argumentation graph (following the previous conditions). us, choosing a legal labeling above another becomes a
maer of preference. erefore, in a multi-agent seing, there has been some aggregation rules that were proposed to
aggregate preferences over labelings. e work (Awad et al. 2015; Rahwan and Tohme´ 2010) dened and analyzed the
argument-wise plurality rule (AWPR) which chooses the collective label of each argument by plurality, independently
from other arguments (i.e. for each argument, among in, out, and undec, the one with the most votes is chosen
as the collective label for this argument). On the other hand, Caminada and Pigozzi (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011)
proposed three operators for aggregating labelings, namely the sceptical operator, the credulous operator, and the super
credulous operator (collectively shortened as SSCOs). At the crux of these operators is the notion that an argument is
not collectively accepted or collectively rejected unless this decision receives a unanimous support. e level of this
unanimously required “support” though varies across the three rules. While one of the rules denes “support” as a strict
agreement by everyone to accept (or reject) an argument in order to collectively accept (or reject) this argument, the
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other two rules are more lenient regarding the support requirement, as they require only some voters to be in a strict
agreement to accept (or reject) an argument, in order to collectively accept (or reject) this argument, provided that all
other voters are undecided. In details, in the rst of a two-stage procedure, the sceptical operator chooses the label in
(respectively, out) as a collective label for an argument when the label in (respectively, out) is chosen by all individuals.
Otherwise, an argument is labeled undec. In the rst of the two-stage and three-stage procedures in credulous and
super credulous operators, the operator chooses the label in (respectively out) as a collective label for an argument
if the label in (respectively, out) is chosen by some individuals, and all other individuals were undecided about this
argument. e purpose of the second and third stages of the three operators is to restore consistency in the collective
outcome. e three operators guarantee a compatible outcome, that is, the outcome does not go against the judgment
of any individual (refer to the appendix for the formal denitions of the AWPR and SSCOs operators).
e result of using the two types of operators correspond to the two options discussed above. AWPR supports the
idea that a label is chosen if it is submied by the majority regardless what the minority think, while the Sceptical and
(Super) Credulous operators (SSCOs) support the idea that minority’s opinion should not be completely ignored.
Analyzing these two types of operators using Arrow’s principle-based approach does not provide a clear advantage
of one over the other. For example, the following two postulates:
Collective Rationality (Awad et al. 2015): the output of the aggregation should be a complete labeling.
Compatibility (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011): the collective label of every argument does not go
against any individual’s label of that argument, where in and out are against each others.
are both satised by SSCOs but both violated by AWPR. On the other hand, the following two postulates:
Unanimity (Booth et al. 2014): For each argument, every unanimously agreed upon label is chosen as
a collective label.
Independence (Awad et al. 2015): the collective label of an argument depends only on the votes on
that argument.
are both satised by AWPR but both violated by SSCOs. us, in the absence of specic preferences over these
postulates, other contextual factors may promote the social acceptability of one aggregation rule or the other. In the
next section, we consider several such contextual factors and tentatively predict their eects, before reporting a test of
these predictions, using randomized control experiments, which are the golden standard for doing experimental research.
3 CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
First, and as explained in (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011), one of the main advantages of SSCOs is that their (compatible)
outcomes can be defended by every individual who took part in the decision. at is, since the collective evaluation
chosen by SSCOs is compatbile with each individual’s evaluation in the sense that there is no collectively rejected
argument that some individuals think should be accepted, and there is no collectively accepted argument that some
individuals think should be rejected, then every individual will feel comfortable defending the collective evaluation
in public aerwards. If laypeople perceive this advantage, then experimental manipulations that stress the need for
everyone involved to defend the outcome should increase preference for outcomes produced by SSCOs against those
produced by AWPR.
Various such manipulations (with regards to what the voters are expected to do aerwards) can be imagined, of
which we will test three, from weakest to strongest: a simple reminder of the consequences of the vote; a statement
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informing participants that each voter is expected to support and defend the group’s decision; and a statement informing
participants that should the decision of the group prove a mistake, everyone in the group would share responsibility.
We deem this last manipulation the strongest because even if group members accept to defend a decision that passed
against their vote, they may not be willing to share the blame in case this decision is mistaken. Indeed Ronnegard
(Ro¨nnegard 2015) argued that the aribution of moral responsibility to all members of a commiee is legitimate when
the decision is taken through unanimous voting, while it is not necessarily the case otherwise.
Second, the dierence between AWPR and SSCOs and the principles they use is mostly about whether to ignore the
opinion of the minority or not. Accordingly, people may be more comfortable with AWPR outcomes when the minority
is very small. To test this hypothesis, we will experimentally manipulate the size of the minority, which will either be
small (9 votes to 1) or large (6 votes to 4).
ird, laypeople show a preference for more conservative outcomes when these outcomes may involve the iniction
of personal harm, that is, when an individual will incur a cost or a punishment as a consequence of the decision
(Bonnefon 2010). Once more, because SSCOs are more conservative than AWPR, then decisions that imply to inict
personal harm should shi preferences towards SSCOs outcomes. To test this hypothesis, we will present participants
with decisions that do or do not imply to inict personal harm.
4 METHOD
A valid comparison of two aggregation rules would require presenting subjects with the detailed explanation of the
aggregation rules, and conrming that subjects fully understand the possible outcomes of each rule given any inputs.
is is problematic in user-studies regarding formal entailment (like this study) since general (logical) principles are
hard to explain to non-logicians.
An alternative approach is to avoid providing technical details and use examples instead, as used in studies of this
form (Oaksford and Hahn 2004; Rahwan et al. 2010; Stenning and Cox 1995). In our case, that would be presenting
subjects with examples, in which voting proles and their potential outcomes (given each rule) are provided rather than
the explanation of the two rules. However, using this approach, in order to make any claim about how two aggregation
rules compare with respect to their favorability by people, a systematic comparison of the two rules is required in
exhaustive manner by considering all possible types of inputs e.g. dierent argument graphs, and dierent labeling
proles. is would naturally increase the number of factors (to account for these variations), and would exponentially
increase the number of conditions and number of needed subjects.
As such, in this study, we only consider a subset of these variations. While these variations are not enough to make
claims about how the two aggregation rules compare, they are enough to draw conclusions about the favorability of
the principles employed by these rules. We will refer to these principles as the plurality principle, that is a label that
uniquely has the most votes shall be chosen as a collective label, a principle employed by AWPR, and the compatibility
principle, that is a label is not collectively accepted (resp. rejected) if it is rejected (resp. accepted) by at least one voter,
a principle employed by SSCOs.
A total of 400 participants, all US residents, were recruited from the Crowdower online platform between March
23rd and May 17th, 2015, and were compensated $0.25 each. Each participant read six vignees that all featured a
commiee trying to make a collective decision about a conclusion A (see below for an example). Relevant arguments
were listed in each vignee, either two in the case of simple argumentation graphs, or four in the case of complex
argumentation graphs (this variable did not impact results, and will not be discussed further). e vignees displayed
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the nal collective outcome on each of these arguments, and the task of the participants was to indicate whether, on
the basis of these votes, the commiee should accept the conclusion A (the AWPR outcome) or declare itself undecided
(the SSCOs outcome). Finally, vignees explained that were the group to declare itself undecided, the decision would be
deferred to another body. Full examples are provided in Appendix C.
Of the six vignees that participants read, three featured a conclusion A that implied to inict personal harm upon
an individual, and three featured a conclusion A that did not imply such a consequence. For example, one vignee
featured the conclusion that a football player should be banned for three games (personal harm), whereas one vignee
featured the conclusion that the government should stock up on anti-u drugs (no personal harm).
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight groups of a 2 × 4 between-participant design, manipulating the
vote ratio and the framing of the decision (i.e., each participant was assigned to one and only one of the eight groups,
and each group was presented with six vignees. e six vignees per group share the same vote ratio and the same
framing of the decision). In one vote ratio condition, all arguments supporting A as well as all arguments rejecting
counterarguments to A received 6 votes against 4. In the other vote ratio condition, all arguments supporting A as well
as all arguments rejecting counterarguments to A received 9 votes against 1. Finally, the framing of the decision came
in four treatments. In the Baseline treatment, no information was provided in addition to the above. In the Reminder
treatment, one sentence reminded participants of the consequences of accepting A (note that this reminder did not
contain any new information). In the Defense treatment, one sentence explained that each member of the commiee was
expected to support and defend the commiee’s decision. In the Responsibility treatment, one sentence explained that if
the decision of the commiee turned out to be wrong, each member would share the responsibility of this mistake.
Table 1. An example of a vignee (including a no personal harm scenario) shown to participants in the following condition: Baseline
treatment, and vote ratio is 6:4. The argumentation graph representing the arguments A, B , and C is similar to the one in Figure 1 (a),
but this graph was not shown to participants.
ID: 016
A governmental commiee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether the government should stock up on medicines
against the Mexican u or not. Consider the following main argument:
• A: e expert virologist says that Mexican u is a threatening pandemic. erefore, the government should stock up on medicines against the
Mexican u.
In considering argument A, the following need to be taken into account:
• B: is expert has a nancial interest in companies making the medicines, according to some journalists. erefore, his advice cannot be
relied upon.
• C: is expert does not have a nancial interest in the companies making the medicines, according to his employer. erefore, his advice can
be relied upon.
In the table below, you can see how many members accept (“Yes”) or reject (“No”) each of the two arguments B and C .
No. of Votes B C
6 No Yes
4 Yes No
Your job is to determine how they will aggregate their votes. Note that we are not asking about your own opinion on the proposed arguments.
Rather, we need to know what you think is appropriate for the group to decide given all the provided information above. e options are:
(1) e group conclude that the government should stock up on medicines against the Mexican u.
(2) e group is undecided about whether the government should stock up on medicines against the Mexican u or not.
In case the commiee is undecided, the decision will be postponed for further investigation.
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Fig. 3. Preference for AWPR outcomes as a function of decision framing (color-coded), vote ratio, and whether the decision implied
to inflict personal harm upon an individual. Boxes shows the average proportion of decisions following AWPR, as well as the
95%-confidence interval around this proportion.
5 RESULTS
Figure 3 displays the average proportion of responses favoring plurality principle, as a function of the decision framing
(color-coded), the vote ratio, and whether the decision implied to inict personal harm. e width of each box in
Figure 3 indicates the 95%-condence interval for these proportions. A box that overlaps with the grey line indicates
that participants in this condition did not show a signicant preference for either principle.
As suggested by Figure 3, participants showed an overall preference for AWPR outcomes. In total, 64% of responses
were in line with AWPR outcomes, and this proportion was signicantly greater than chance in 11 out of 16 experimental
conditions—SSCOs outcomes, on the other hand, were never signicantly preferred in any experimental condition.
e preference for AWPR outcomes, though, was qualied by contextual factors. e visual exploration of Figure 3
suggests three main results. First, it seems that the framing of the decision did not signicantly aect participants,
since the colored boxes are more or less aligned with each other within the four blocks displayed in Figure 3. Second, it
appears that participants were less willing to endorse AWPR outcomes in the presence of a large minority, since most
of the boxes cross the indierence line in the 6 to 4 condition, whereas none of the boxes cross the indierence line in
the 9 to 1 condition. Finally, Figure 3 suggests that participants were less willing to endorse AWPR outcomes when the
decision implied to inict personal harm, given the leward shi of the boxes in the personal harm condition.
ese results were conrmed by a mixed-design analysis of variance in which the dependent variable was the
proportion of AWPR responses, the between-participant predictors were the vote ratio and the framing condition, and
the within-participant predictor was whether the decision implied to inict personal harm upon an individual. e
results of this analysis are displayed in Table 2. As expected, the analysis detected a statistically signicant eect of the
vote ratio (64% of AWPR outcomes in the 9 to 1 condition, vs. 58% in the 6 to 4 condition), a statistically signicant eect
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Table 2. Results of the mixed-design ANOVA analyzing the eect of decision framing, vote ratio, and infliction of personal harm on
the preference for AWPR outcomes. The table shows the degree of freedom (DF), the sum of squares (Sum Sq), the mean of squares
(Mean Sq = Sum SqDF ), the F test statistics (F =
Mean Sq
Mean Sq (Residuals) , and the p-value (P (> F )). The p-value in the second and the
fih line indicates a significant eect of the vote ratio and infliction of personal harm, respectively.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F)
Framing 3 7.3 2.4 2.0 .11
Ratio 1 25.2 25.2 20.5 < .001
Framing:Ratio 3 0.9 0.3 0.2 .86
Residuals 392 481.3 1.2
Harm 1 14.6 14.6 25.0 <.001
Framing:Harm 3 1.1 0.4 0.6 .59
Ratio:Harm 1 0.1 0.1 0.2 .64
Framing:Ratio:Harm 3 1.5 0.5 0.9 .45
Residuals 392 228.6 0.6
of the iniction of personal harm (59% of AWPR outcomes if personal harm, vs. 68% if not), but no eect of the framing
of the decision. Post-hoc comparisons using a Bonferroni correction indicated that none of the treatments diered
signicantly from the Baseline treatment (all p > .31). Bonferroni correction (Dunn 1961) is a multiple-comparison
method used to adjust for the incorrect rejection of null hypothesis (Type I error) in the case of several simultaneously
tested hypotheses. Given these results and the statistical power of our analysis (85% power to detect any eect beyond
small, i.e., f > .25) we can conclude that even if we had failed to capture a true eect of the framing variable, this eect
would likely be small and inconsequential.
6 RELATEDWORK
e study of aggregation and voting dates back to the 18th century. Since then, dierent approaches have been
employed in order to decide which method is more appropriate to use. e early years of classical voting witnessed
an example-based approach adopted by Borda and Condorcet who separately used examples to show the pitfalls of a
voting rule, when compared to their own distinct alternative rules (McLean et al. 1995). Years later, Kenneth Arrow
(Arrow 1951; Arrow et al. 2002) adopted a more systematic, principle-based approach by evaluating aggregation rules
on the base of satisfying seemingly plausible, “fairness” postulates. Arrow showed the impossibility of satisfying a
small set of these postulates together by any aggregation method. is established the superiority of some rules over
others, based on subsets of postulates. us, in a given scenario, once the desirable postulates are identied, choosing
an appropriate rule becomes a systematic task. However, in reality, identifying the desirable postulates in a specic
scenario can be subjective, and dependent on complex factors. Aiming to characterize these complex factors, some
studies adopted an experiment-based approach (Bassi 2015; Fiorina and Plo 1978; Forsythe et al. 1996; Guarnaschelli
et al. 2000; Van der Straeten et al. 2010). ese studies established the desirability of some aggregation rules given some
assumed conditions from a cognitive perspective.
In the last two decades, aggregation was studied in dierent new seings including Judgment Aggregation (JA)
(Grossi and Pigozzi 2014; List 2012; List and Polak 2010; List and Puppe 2009), non-binary JA (Dokow and Holzman
2010a,b), belief merging (Lin and Mendelzon 1999), labeling aggregation (Awad et al. 2015; Booth et al. 2014; Caminada
and Pigozzi 2011; Rahwan and Tohme´ 2010), and aggregation of annotated linguistic resources (Endriss and Ferna´ndez
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2013). While these seings are believed to be closely related, the connection among them and between each of them
and the classical voting problem (known as preference aggregation) is not yet fully characterized.
7 DISCUSSION
Formal models of reasoning, argumentation, and decision making can be assessed by intuitions, hypothetical exam-
ples and simulations—but also by collecting experimental data in the manner of cognitive psychologists, behavioral
economists, and experimental philosophers. Indeed, there is a growing interest in the articial intelligence community
for assessing the cognitive, psychological plausibility of formal models of reasoning (Amgoud et al. 2005; Benferhat
et al. 2005; Bonnefon et al. 2008; Dubois et al. 2008; Rahwan et al. 2010). Here, we contribute to this tradition by
experimentally identifying the contexts in which human participants would display a preference for SSCOs (aggregation
rules that aim at producing compatible outcomes) versus AWPR (the counterpart to the plurality rule in the domain of
argumentation).
Our results suggest that outcomes of AWPR were generally more preferred, except in situations where (1) the decision
implied to inict personal harm to an individual, and (2) the vote would pass by a narrow margin. e presence of each
of these two factors decreases the preference for AWPR outcomes, and their joint presence leads people to hesitate
between AWPR and SSCOs outcomes. However, and interestingly given previous arguments for using SSCOs, (3) we
did not observe an increased preference for SSCOs outcomes in situations where all commiee members were to defend
or take responsibility for the commiee’s collective decision, independently of their own vote. We now discuss in turn
these three ndings.
e fact that participants were less likely to endorse the plurality principle employed by AWPR for decisions that
would result in the iniction of harm to an individual is consistent with previous results showing that people prefer
more conservative voting rules in such circumstances (Bonnefon 2007, 2010). is eect may reect a concern with
avoiding costly, unfair false alarms (List 2006), or the emotional saliency of an identied victim (Kogut and Ritov 2006),
but its psychological underpinnings are outside the scope of this article. As a consequence of this nding, though, it
may be useful to search for novel voting rules which people deem desirable when they have to deliberate on a personal
punishment. Indeed, while we observed that the desirability of AWPR outcomes decreased in these circumstances, we
did not observe a full switch to a preference for SSCOs outcomes.
We also observe that participants were less comfortable with the plurality principle when the vote would pass by
a narrow margin (6 to 4 vs. 9 to 1 in our experiment). is result is not surprising: Given that the plurality principle
eectively ignores the opinion of the minority, it makes sense that people are more comfortable with it when the
minority that is ignored is small. e applied consequences of this nding are limited, though. Indeed, shiing to SSCOs
when the vote is expected to be a close call essentially amounts to deciding in advance that no decision will be reached.
More importantly, we nd no evidence for one purportedly central advantage of the compatibility principle employed
by SSCOs, that is, their greater desirability when all voters are held accountable (or even responsible) for the commiee’s
decision, independently of their own vote. Participants appeared willing to vote according to AWPR outcomes even in
these circumstances. One explanation for this nding is that the plurality principle is natural enough to appear justied
in most situations. Another possibility is that participants weighted against each other the inconvenience for some to
defend a decision they opposed, to the inconvenience for all to defend an indecision nobody voted for. Indeed, if Do is
the inconvenience of defending a decision that one opposed, and Du is the inconvenience of defending an undecided
verdict when one was not undecided, then it might be rational to prefer AWPR when Du > mN × Do , where N is the
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total number of voters andm is the number of voters in the minority. For example, in the case of a 6 to 4 vote, it might
still be rational (at least from a utilitarian perspective) to apply AWPR when the inconvenience of defending indecision
is at least four tenth of the inconvenience of defending the position that one voted against.
In sum, we report the rst experimental investigation of the contextual factors that may lead human voters to lean
toward SSCOs or AWPR aggregation procedures. Although we observed a general preference for outcomes produced
by AWPR, this preference was moderated by contextual factors. We found null evidence against one important prior
claim (SSCOs are good when everyone is expected to defend the collective decision), positive evidence for a vote ratio
eect (people like AWPR beer when the minority is small), and positive evidence for a moral eect (people like AWPR
less when they deliberate about inicting personal harm to an individual).
ese results provide clear suggestions regarding what aggregation rules are more favorable to use in some contexts,
while at the same time they identify contexts in which the favorability of an aggregation rule over another is still open.
is opens the door for further work to explore the favorability of new rules in such contexts, on the road towards
eventually oering a comprehensive mapping from a given conicting-domain context to the appropriate aggregation
rule to use in that context.
It is important to note that our study compares the two rules using only some variations of argumentation graphs
and labeling proles. Further, the stimuli used probe the favorability of the outcomes of the aggregation rules (rather
than the rules themselves). ese outcomes can coincide with outcomes by other rules not studied here. As such, the
results above are beer interpreted on the level of the principles employed by these rules rather than on the level of
the rules themselves. In order to make stronger claims regarding the two rules, the consideration of an exhasutive
comparison is required, which can be a topic for future work. Future research will also identify the psychological
mechanisms underlying these preferences, but also the voting rules that people may approve of in situations (e.g.,
personal harm plus narrow margin) where they seem unsatised with AWPR and SSCOs both.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Awad is grateful for the fund provided by Masdar Institute to run the experiments. Support through the ANR-Labex
IAST is gratefully acknowledged by Bonnefon.
APPENDIX
A LABELING AGGREGATION METHODS
For this appendix, we write in(L), out(L), and undec(L) for the set of arguments that are labeled in, out, and undec
respectively by labeling L. A labeling L can be represented as L = (in(L),out(L),undec(L)). Equivalently, we also denote
a labeling L as: L = {(A, l)|L(A) = l for all A ∈ A, l ∈ {in, out, undec}}.
e problem of labeling aggregation can be formulated as a set of individuals that collectively decide how an
argumentation framework AF = 〈A,⇀〉 must be labelled.
Denition A.1 (Labeling aggregation problem (Awad et al. 2015)). Let Ag = {1, . . . ,n} be a nite non-empty set of
agents, and AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation framework. A labeling aggregation problem is a pair LAP = 〈Ag,AF〉.
Each individual i ∈ Ag has a labeling Li which expresses the evaluation of AF by this individual. A labeling prole
is an |Ag |-tuple of labelings.
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Denition A.2 (Labeling prole (Awad et al. 2015)). Let LAP = 〈Ag,AF〉 be a labeling aggregation problem. We use
L = (L1, . . . ,Ln ) ∈ L(AF) |Ag | to denote a labeling prole, where L(AF) is the class of labelings of AF. Additionally,
we use L(a) to denote the labeling prole (i.e. an |Ag |-tuple) of an argument a ∈ A i.e. L(a) = (L1(a), . . . ,Ln (a)).
e aggregation of individuals’ labelings can be dened as a partial function.2
Denition A.3 (Aggregation function (Awad et al. 2015)). Let LAP = 〈Ag,AF〉 be a labeling aggregation problem. An
aggregation function for LAP is a function F : L(AF)n → L(AF).
For each a ∈ A, [F (L)](a) denotes the collective label assigned to a, if F is dened for L = (L1, . . . ,Ln ).
A.1 The Argument-Wise Plurality Rule
e Argument-Wise Plurality Rule (AWPR) M was proposed in (Awad et al. 2015; Rahwan and Tohme´ 2010). Intuitively,
for each argument, it selects the label that appears most frequently in the individual labelings.
Denition A.4 (Argument-Wise Plurality Rule (AWPR) (Awad et al. 2015)). Let AF = 〈A,⇀〉 be an argumentation
framework. Given any argumenta ∈ A and any proleL = (L1, . . . ,Ln ), it holds that [M(L)](a) = la ∈ {in, out, undec}
i
|{i : Li (a) = la }| > max
l ′a,la
|{i : Li (a) = l ′a }|
Note that M is dened for all proles that cause no ties, i.e. M(L) is dened i there does not exist any argument
a ∈ A for which we have at least two labels la and l ′a with la , l ′a and
|{i : Li (a) = la }| = |{i : Li (a) = l ′a }| = max
l
|{i : Li (a) = l}|
A.2 Sceptical and (Super) Credulous Operators (SSCOs)
e three aggregation operators, namely the Sceptical, the Credulous and the Super Credulous, were dened in (Caminada
and Pigozzi 2011). In their work, a labeling prole is represented as a set, since the number of votes for each label is
irrelevant (as long as it is not zero) for these operators. For convenience, we will assume here that the labeling prole is
a tuple (as in Def. A.2).
Crucial to the denitions of the three operators are the notions of less or equally commied and compatible. A labeling
L1 is said to be less or equally commied than another labeling L2 if and only if every argument that is labeled in by L1
is also labeled in by L2 and every argument that is labeled out by L1 is also labeled out by L2.
Denition A.5 (Less or equally commied v (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011)). Let L1 and L2 be two labelings of ar-
gumentation framework AF = 〈A,⇀〉. L1 is less or equally commied as L2 (L1 v L2) i in(L1) ⊆ in(L2) and
out(L1) ⊆ out(L2).
Two labelings L1 and L2 are said to be compatible with each other if and only if for every argument, there is no
in − out conict between the two. In other words, every argument that is labeled in by L1 is not labeled out by L2 and
every argument that is labeled out by L1 is not labeled in by L2.
Denition A.6 (Compatible labelings ≈ (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011)). Let L1 and L2 be two labelings of argumentation
frameworkAF = 〈A,⇀〉. We say that L1 is compatible with L2 (L1 ≈ L2) i in(L1)∩out(L2) = ∅ and out(L1)∩in(L2) =
∅
2We state that the function is partial to allow for cases in which collective judgment may be undened (e.g. when there is a tie in voting).
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e following two denitions are used in the denition of the operators:
Denition A.7 (Initial operators u, unionsq (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011)). e sceptical initial u and credulous initial unionsq
operators are labeling aggregation operators dened as the following:
• u((L1, . . . ,Ln )) = {(A, in)|∀i ∈ Ag : Li (A) = in} ∪ {(A, out)|∀i ∈ Ag : Li (A) = out} ∪ {(A, undec)|∃i ∈ Ag :
Li (A) , in ∧ ∃j ∈ Ag : Lj (A) , out}
• unionsq((L1, . . . ,Ln )) = {(A, in)|∃i ∈ Ag : Li (A) = in ∧ ¬∃j ∈ Ag : Lj (A) = out} ∪ {(A, out)|∃i ∈ Ag : Li (A) =
out ∧ ¬∃j ∈ Ag : Lj (A) = in} ∪ {(A, undec)|∀i ∈ Ag : Li (A) = undec ∨ (∃j ∈ Ag : Lj (A) = in ∧ ∃k ∈ Ag :
Lk (A) = out)}
Denition A.8 (Down-admissible ↓ and up-complete ↑ labelings (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011)). Let L be a labeling of
argumentation framework AF = 〈A,⇀〉. e down-admissible labeling of L, denoted as L↓, is the biggest element of
the set of all admissible labelings that are less or equally commied than L. e up-complete labeling of L, denoted as
L↑, is the smallest element of the set of all complete labelings that are bigger or equally commied than L.
Where complete labelings are labelings that satify the three conditions in Def. 2.3, admissible labelings are labelings
that satisfy the rst two conditions of Def. 2.3, and biggest and smallest are dened as with respect to Def. A.5. Now,
we provide the denition of the three operators:3
Denition A.9 (SSCOs: soAF , coAF and scoAF (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011)). Given an argumentation framework
AF, the sceptical soAF , the credulous coAF and the super credulous scoAF operators are labeling aggregation operators
dened as the following:
• soAF((L1, . . . ,Ln )) = (u((L1, . . . ,Ln ))) ↓.
• coAF((L1, . . . ,Ln )) = (unionsq((L1, . . . ,Ln ))) ↓.
• scoAF((L1, . . . ,Ln )) = ((unionsq((L1, . . . ,Ln ))) ↓) ↑.
Note that the super credulous operator was introduced since the credulous operator can fail to produce a complete
collective labeling. is is not the case for sceptical operator, which always produces complete collective labeling.
A.3 Postulates
Inspired by Arrow’s principle-based approach, many postulates were dened in the context of argumentation. Most of
these postulates are similar to the ones proposed in Judgment Aggregation. We provide here the formal denition of
the four postulates that were mentioned in the introduction. Collective rationality requires that any possible outcome of
the aggregation rule has to be a complete labeling.
Collective Rationality (Awad et al. 2015) For all proles L such that F (L) is dened, F (L) ∈
Comp(AF).
where Comp(AF) is the set of all possible complete labelings for the argumentation framrework AF. Compatibility
requires that the collective label of each argument is compatible (w.r.t Def. A.6) with the label by every individual for
that argument.
Compatibility (Caminada and Pigozzi 2011) For all i ∈ Ag and a ∈ A we have [FAF(L)](a) ≈ Li (a).
Unanimity requires that for each argument, every unanimously agreed upon label is chosen as a collective label.
3For a beer understanding of the three operators, the reader is encouraged to see the clarifying examples of the three operators in (Caminada and
Pigozzi 2011).
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Unanimity (Booth et al. 2014) For each a ∈ A, if there is some x ∈ {in, out, undec} such that Li (a) = x
for all i ∈ Ag then [FAF(L)](a) = x.
Finally, independence requires that the collective label of an argument depends only on the votes on that argument.
Independence (Awad et al. 2015) For any two proles L = (L1, . . . ,Ln ), L′ = (L′1, . . . ,L′n ) such that
F (L) and F (L′) are dened, and for all a ∈ A, if Li (a) = L′i (a) for all i ∈ Ag, then [F (L)](a) = [F (L′)](a).
B ARGUMENT SETS
Following, are the six stories that were used in the experiment. e argumentation structure representing the rst
three is shown in Figures 4 and the one representing the other three is shown in Figure 5.
B.1 Simple AF (shown in Figure 4)
2 3
Fig. 4. A simple argumentation graph with the three possible complete labelings. Nodes are arguments, and arcs are the defeat
relations. The color white refers to in, the color black refers to out, and the color gray refers to undec.
(1) Argument set 1 - Argument from Knowledge
Context: A governmental commiee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether
the government should stock up on medicines against the Mexican u or not.
• A: e expert virologist says that Mexican u is a threatening pandemic. erefore, the government
should stock up on medicines against the Mexican u.
• B: is expert has a nancial interest in companies making the medicines, according to some journalists.
erefore, his advice cannot be relied upon.
• C: is expert does not have a nancial interest in the companies making the medicines, according to his
employer. erefore, his advice can be relied upon.
In case the commiee is undecided, the decision will be postponed for further investigation.
(2) Argument set 2 - Argument from Analogy, Classication and Precedent
Context: A school commiee of 10 teachers gathered to make a collective decision about whether the school
should have a uniform or not.
• A: Aer the Central Public School forced students to have a uniform, the aendance of students increased.
erefore, we should have a uniform in our school.
• B: ere can be other factors that contributed to the eect of uniform on aendance. eir case might be
dierent from ours.
• C: We share the same entry standards with the Central Public School and our student’s families have
similar socio-economic status to theirs.4
In case the commiee is undecided, the decision will be deferred to the school principal who will form another
commiee.
4One might note that, in reality, argument C might not defeat B . We only noticed that this can be the case aer the experiment was over. However, upon
removing this example and redoing the analysis, no major change was found in the results.
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(3) Argument set 3 - Argument from Knowledge
Context: A hiring commiee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether a specic
candidate is worthy of a good oer or not.
• A: e candidate’s former adviser provided a strong recommendation leer. erefore, this candidate is
worthy of a good oer.
• B: It is in the adviser’s interest that her former student gets a good position. erefore, she is probably
over-selling him.
• C: e adviser knows she can lose her credibility if the candidate is not as good as she claims.
In case the commiee is undecided, the decision will be postponed to get further reference leers.
B.2 Non-Simple AF (shown in Figure 5)
2 3
Fig. 5. A non-simple argumentation graph with three possible complete labelings. Nodes are arguments, and arcs are the defeat
relations. The color white refers to in, the color black refers to out, and the color gray refers to undec.
(1) Argument set 1 - Argument from Knowledge
Context: A commiee of 10 jury members gathered to make a collective decision about whether there is
evidence against Stephen or not.
• A: e witness saw Stephen in the parking area next to the crime scene. erefore, there is evidence
against Stephen.
• B: It was dark then. erefore, the witness probably mistook someone else for Stephen.
• C: e parking area is well lit. erefore, the witness could clearly identify Stephen.
• D: e witness hates Stephen. erefore, the witness is biased.
• E: e witness did not know Stephen well. erefore, the witness is unbiased.
In case the commiee is undecided, the decision will be deferred to the judge who will form another commiee.
(2) Argument set 2 - Argument from Knowledge
Context: A group of 10 employees were assigned the task of making a collective decision about whether the
company’s next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls or not.
• A: e travel agent recommended visiting Niagara Falls. erefore, the next summer excursion should be
to Niagara Falls.
• B: e travel agent has never been to Niagara Falls. erefore, we cannot trust his recommendation.
• C: e travel agent has organized many trips to Niagara Falls before. erefore, we can trust his recom-
mendation.
• D: e travel agent recommended visiting a place with natural aractions citing Niagara Falls as an
example. He did not specically recommend Niagara Falls.
Manuscript submied to ACM
Experimental Assessment of Aggregation Principles in Argumentation-enabled Collective Intelligence 17
• E: e travel agent specically recommended visiting Niagara Falls citing its natural aractions as the
main reason.
In case the commiee is undecided, the decision will be deferred to the senior management who will form
another commiee.
(3) Argument set 3 - Argument from Analogy, Classication and Precedent
Context: A referees commiee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether the
footballer Marconi should be banned for three matches or not.
• A: Player Marconi criticized the referee via his ocial Twier account. In a previous incident, the footballer
Borello was banned for three matches for publicly criticizing the referee. erefore, Marconi should be
banned for three matches.
• B: Borello criticized the referee in a press conference. at was a dierent case.
• C: Both cases are similar in what it maers.
• D: In another previous incident, the footballer Zoi criticized a referee and got away with it. at was a
similar case.
• E: Zoi’s criticism was less direct than the criticism by Marconi and Borello.
In case the commiee is undecided, the decision will be postponed for further investigation.
C VIGNETTES
Here are some concrete examples of vignees using the argument sets above.
C.1 Simple AF, Case: ratio 9 : 1, reminder, Scenario: Uniform
ID: 229
A school commiee of 10 teachers gathered to make a collective decision about whether the school should have a uniform or not. Consider the
following main argument:
• A: Aer the Central Public School forced students to have a uniform, the aendance of students increased. erefore, we should have a
uniform in our school.
In considering argument A, the following arguments need to be taken into account:
• B: ere can be other factors that contributed to the eect of uniform on aendance. eir case might be dierent from ours.
• C: We share the same entry standards with the Central Public School and our student’s families have similar socio-economic status to theirs.
In the table below, you can see how many members accept (“Yes”) or reject (“No”) each of the two arguments B and C .
No. of Votes B C
9 No Yes
1 Yes No
Your job is to determine how they will aggregate their votes. Note that we are not asking about your own opinion on the proposed arguments.
Rather, we need to know what you think is appropriate for the group to decide given all the provided information above. e options are:
(1) e group conclude that the school should have a uniform.
[is will add extra costs on the students’ parents’ side]
(2) e group is undecided about whether the school should have a uniform or not.
[In this case, the decision will be deferred to the school principal who will form another commiee]
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C.2 Complex AF, Case: ratio 9 : 1, defending, Scenario: Marconi
ID: 169
A referees commiee of 10 members gathered to make a collective decision about whether the footballer Marconi should be banned for three
matches or not. Consider the following main argument:
• A: Player Marconi criticized the referee via his ocial Twier account. In a previous incident, the footballer Borello was banned for three
matches for publicly criticizing the referee. erefore, Marconi should be banned for three matches.
In considering argument A, the following arguments need to be taken into account:
• B: Borello criticized the referee in a press conference. at was a dierent case.
• C: Both cases are similar in what it maers.
• D: In another previous incident, the footballer Zoi criticized a referee and got away with it. at was a similar case.
• E: Zoi’s criticism was less direct than the criticism by Marconi and Borello.
In the table below, you can see how many members accept (“Yes”) or reject (“No”) each of the four arguments B , C , D , and E .
No. of Votes B C D E
9 No Yes No Yes
1 Yes No Yes No
Your job is to determine how they will aggregate their votes. Note that we are not asking about your own opinion on the proposed arguments.
Rather, we need to know what you think is appropriate for the group to decide given all the provided information above. e options are:
(1) e group conclude that Marconi should be banned for three matches.
(2) e group is undecided about whether Marconi should be banned for three matches or not.
In case the commiee is undecided, the decision will be postponed for further investigation.
Note that once a collective decision is made, each commiee member is expected to support and defend it. It may be awkward for a
commiee member who disagrees with the group conclusion to defend it to others.
C.3 Complex AF, Case: ratio 6 : 4, responsibility, Scenario: Excursion
ID: 356
A group of 10 employees were assigned the task of making a collective decision about whether the company’s next summer excursion should be to
Niagara Falls or not. Consider the following main argument:
• A: e travel agent recommended visiting Niagara Falls. erefore, the next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls.
In considering argument A, the following arguments need to be taken into account:
• B: e travel agent has never been to Niagara Falls. erefore, we cannot trust his recommendation.
• C: e travel agent has organized many trips to Niagara Falls before. erefore, we can trust his recommendation.
• D: e travel agent recommended visiting a place with natural aractions citing Niagara Falls as an example. He did not specically
recommend Niagara Falls.
• E: e travel agent specically recommended visiting Niagara Falls citing its natural aractions as the main reason.
In the table below, you can see how many members accept (“Yes”) or reject (“No”) each of the four arguments B , C , D , and E .
No. of Votes B C D E
6 No Yes No Yes
4 Yes No Yes No
Your job is to determine how they will aggregate their votes. Note that we are not asking about your own opinion on the proposed arguments.
Rather, we need to know what you think is appropriate for the group to decide given all the provided information above. e options are:
(1) e group conclude that the company’s next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls.
[If this decision turned out to be wrong, each member would share the responsibility for this mistake]
(2) e group is undecided about whether the company’s next summer excursion should be to Niagara Falls or not.
[In this case, the decision will be deferred to the senior management who will form another commiee]
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